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1 Introduction
In this article we study the technological, institutional and organizational
factors that have influenced the cost of liquefying natural gas (LNG) after
the first LNG plant came on stream in 1964. A large part of discovered
gasfields are situated too far away from the major gas markets to make direct
pipeline transportation viable (see IEA (2001)). Such gas fields are often
coined stranded gas fields, and it is the desire to capitalize these gas reserves
which has spurred the development of the LNG industry.
Today, LNG is regarded as one of the fastest growing sub-sectors of the
energy industry. According to many sources, e.g. EIA (2003), prospects for
continued growth are very good; there is increasing demand for combined
cycle gas turbine electricity generation (CCGT), major energy markets are in
the process of being deregulated making it easier to sell LNG, and costs in
the LNG supply chain have decreased radically the last decade. In addition,
some regions, as the U.S., seem to have entered into a situation with a chronic
natural gas supply shortage. For some of these regions LNG may be the only
viable solution.
To our knowledge, there exists no recent study in the economics literature
of LNG supply chain costs. In this paper, we therefore look at the following
two research questions: What are the factors driving the fall in liquefaction
unit costs? To what extent is the cost of liquefaction likely to fall further?
In order to answer these questions we have used historical data to estimate
experience curves for the construction of LNG liquefaction plants, also tak-
ing into account other relevant factors than pure experience. We base our
estimation on a unique data set with price and scale information on nearly
all LNG liquefaction plants and the number of LNG liquefaction technology
suppliers at each point in time.
Experience curves may be powerful tools when it comes to explaining past
and indicating future cost gains for relatively new technologies. In its basic
form, an experience curve explores the relationship between accumulated pro-
duction at time t and average cost of production at time t. It has been shown
in numerous studies that a significant, negative trend can be found between
the cost of a new technology and accumulated supply of this technology, take
for instance the CCGT electricity generation technology (IEA (2000)).
There are at least four, more fundamental, mechanisms at work behind an
experience curve, see IEA (2000). First, as personnel engaged in the planning
and production of the new product gain experience with the new technology,
say an LNG liquefaction plant, they are likely to become more eﬃcient and
better organized to perform the tasks at hand. This improves the productivity
of labour, and unit costs are reduced. The process is often coined ”learning
by doing”, and was first formally described in the seminal paper by Arrow
(1962).
Second, experience may also induce research and development (R&D).
This may lead to further improvements in technology - so called process
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innovations- which also reduce unit costs. Some studies have tried to separate
the eﬀects of organizational learning and induced R&D by keeping track of
targeted public funding to R&D projects, see for example Ibenholt (2002) and
Jespersen (2002). However, technological progress may also be independent
of experience with the product under study, e.g. gas turbines have become
more eﬀective, which have implied savings in the overall project cost of an
LNG plant. If both an independent technological progress and accumulated
production increases over time, one may exaggerate the eﬀect of actual pro-
duction experience, if this independent technological change is not accounted
for.
Third, it is often the case that the market for a new technology is poorly
developed, hence, potential scale advantages in the production or process
technology cannot be explored. As time goes by, the size of the market may
increase, and so does the scale of each production unit. Thus we will observe
that costs decrease with accumulated production, but then it would be wrong
to interpret this as technical progress in a strict sense. This is pointed out
in Hall and Howell (1985). However, increased scale of production can also
become possible due to technological progress, e.g. due to better materials
technology, it has become possible to build larger cooling towers.
Fourth, when the market size picks up, more firms enter and start to
supply the new technology, and prices fall due to increased competition. In
this case it would clearly be wrong to interpret the fall in producer prices as
technical progress or organizational learning. In most empirical applications
average cost is not observable, and the price of the product in question is used
instead. As long as the price is used as a proxy for unit costs, we may also
have an eﬀect on the observed unit price through increased competition.
While learning and technological progress can continue to work together
for a long time, the limits of the scale eﬀect and the competition eﬀect with
respect to cost savings are likely reached much sooner. Our aim is therefore
to separate the influence on costs from the diﬀerent eﬀects in our experience
curve estimation. We confine our study to the eﬀects on capital cost, that
is, the cost of building a natural gas liquefaction factory. For an LNG plant,
capital costs generally amount to more than 95% of the total annualized
expenditure, of which roughly 75% is total direct costs (see IEA (2001) and
DiNapoli (1986)).
Moreover, we concentrate on the liquefaction part of the LNG supply
chain. According to for example Petroleum Economist (2001) and Weems
(2000), the capital cost of LNG liquefaction, make up about 40-50% of total
LNG-chain capital costs. In a forthcoming discussion paper we study the two
other major cost components; transport costs and regassification costs, see
Greaker and Sagen (2005).
Our study is inspired by Joskow and Rose (1985), who investigate the
construction costs of coal-burning generation units in the US. They find an
organizational learning eﬀect which can be separated from the scale eﬀect.
Although the study of Joskow and Rose (1985) have many similarities with
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our study, the two studies diﬀer in an important aspect. While we only have
data on the price paid by the buyer of an LNG liquefaction facility, they have
access to cost data. Thus, they do not have to take into account that the
mark-up over marginal cost may have varied between the observations.
Our paper attempts to include mark-up pricing in the experience curve
model estimation. This is also done by Lieberman (1984) in his study of
chemical industry products. Lieberman (1984) looks at diﬀerent levels of
market concentration using the Herfindahl index to separate the data. The
study reveals that the negative eﬀect on the price from new market entry
was significantly higher in an initially high market concentration situation
compared with a low market concentration situation.
We are aware that there exist both databases of LNG costs, and detailed
cost models of LNG plants, see for example DiNapoli and Yost (2003). How-
ever, both the databases and the models are the proprietary of consulting
firms, and not available to the public. Hence, as far as we know, this pa-
per presents the first generally available econometric analysis of LNG plant
capital cost developments.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses some the-
oretical features of market competition when costs depend on accumulated
output. The third and fourth section includes a short introduction to LNG
liquefaction technology and factors driving the capital cost of liquefaction
facilities. Section five explains our data sources, and briefly discusses an im-
portant anomaly in the dataset. Section six and seven sets out our estimation
model, and section eight presents our results. In section nine we conclude.
2 Experience curves
In its basic form an experience curve describes the relationship between unit
costs/unit price and accumulated production of some commodity, see Boston
Consulting Group (1972). It is assumed that experience with production of
the commodity can lead to both organizational learning and technological
advances. Most recent studies of experience curves, see e.g. IEA (2000), have
used a variant of the following equation in order to describe the experience
process:
ci = a0Q(t)
−a1, (1)
where ci is the unit cost, Q(t) is accumulated production at time t and a0
and a1 are positive parameters. The parameter a1 expresses the speed of the
experience process, that is, the higher the a1, the faster will costs per. unit
decrease with accumulated output.
Experience can be either industry wide of firm specific. In the latter case
Q(t) denotes the accumulated production of a single firm. If the firm is for-
ward looking, it would take future gains from experience into consideration
when setting the current price. This is analyzed in a seminal paper by Spence
(1981),both for a monopoly and for an oligopoly with sequential entry. Ac-
cording to Spence the monopoly will not equate marginal income with current
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marginal cost. Instead the relevant marginal cost is the cost of the last unit
i.e. at the end of the time horizon. Hence, the monopoly will operate with a
negative mark-up and a negative profit the first years.
Introducing more firms do not change this result as long as experience is
firm specific. The first firm to enter the market will enjoy lower costs than
later entrants at all periods, and hence, be able to make positive profits in
the future outweighing the initial negative profits. However, matters change
if there are extensive spill-overs between firms, that is, experience is industry
wide. Later entrants can then operate with nearly the same costs as the first
firm making it harder for the first firm to cover initial losses. Thus, with
industry wide experience, firms are not likely to set prices below marginal
costs in the start-up of a new market.
Of course, if only price data is available, forward looking firms and lim-
ited spill-overs make estimating experience eﬀects from accumulated produc-
tion very diﬃcult. In the case of a monopoly you could observe a constant
price even though the unobserved unit cost was monotonically falling (Spence
(1981)).
In our analysis we assume that liquefaction technology firms are not for-
ward looking, but that they base their pricing decisions on current unit costs.
Through out the history of LNG the development of the market for LNG
liquefaction plants has been sluggish and uncertain - especially before 1999.
Thus, it must have been diﬃcult for the liquefaction technology firms to form
expectations about future demand, and future learning possibilities. Years
have passed without any new liquefaction facilities being built, hence, histori-
cal pricing of liquefaction technology, with point of departure in an uncertain
marginal cost sometime in the future, seems unlikely.
3 LNG liquefaction technology
The first LNG liquefaction unit came into operation in 1964 at Arzew, Alge-
ria. The liquefaction process takes natural gas and cools it via compression
to −1610 C, shrinking it to 1/600th of its original volume and making trans-
portation by ship economical. Natural gas consists mostly of methane CH4,
but also includes other substances like sulphur, CO2, C3H8 (prophane) etc.
These substances must be removed from the natural gas before cooling it
down to −1610 C. If not, they become solid, and may interrupt the cooling
process. A LNG liquefaction unit therefore also produces other chemicals like
solid sulphur and LPG (liquid prophane/buthane gas).1
A typical LNG liquefaction plant consists of one or more process trains.
A process train can be viewed as a standalone liquefaction unit, that is, one
process train can be shut down without aﬀecting operations at adjacent trains.
The cooling process can be achieved by one of several proprietary methods. A
majority of the liquefaction plants use the method developed by Air Products
and Chemical Inc. (APCI), which is referred to as a mixed refrigerants with
1Se for instance Institute for law, energy and enterprise, ”Introduction to LNG” (2003).
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propane precooling process. In total APCI has constructed and installed 57
trains of which some are not yet operating.
There are four other proprietary methods. Philips together with Bechtel
market the Cascade process. This process was developed for the world´s
second LNG liquefaction plant at Kenai, Alaska which started operations in
1969. Since then, Philips/Bechtel has stayed out of the LNG construction
business until the start up of the Atlantic LNG project in Trinidad in 1999.
The first LNG liquefaction plant at Arzev, Algeria in 1964 was outfitted
with the Prico technology of Black and Veatch Pritchard. To our knowledge
the Prico technology is used only at Arzev and at Skikda, Algeria for the 1981
installation (phase II), in total 6 trains.
In the beginning of the LNG liquefaction market, Technip also had their
own process; the Teal process. It was used for the phase I installation at
Skikda. Technip has later joined in a strategic alliance with APCI, and are
no longer in the business of marketing their own process.
In recent years the German company Linde and Shell, with their Dual
Mixed Refrigerant (DMR) process, have also entered the LNG liquefaction
market with their own technologies. The Linde process is to be used for
the extension of the liquefaction capacity at the Burrup, Northwest shelf,
Australia, starting deliveries in 2004. In addition, the Linde process will
also be used at Snøhvit, Norway, which is scheduled to start delivering LNG
from 2006. The Shell DMR process will be first used for deliveries from the
Sakhalin II LNG plant, eastern Russia, from 2007 (See for instance Thomas
(1997) and Shukri (2004) for more on the diﬀerent methods).
To sum up; in the sixties and in the early seventies, the world’s first
five LNG plants used four diﬀerent technologies, supplied by four diﬀerent
engineering firms. Then, during the rest of the seventies, the eighties and until
1999, only the APCI technology was installed except from the installation in
Skikda, phase II by Prico. In the late 1990´s Philips reentered the market,
shortly followed by new designs from Linde and Shell, and the developers
of LNG plants again have four diﬀerent firms and liquefying technologies to
choose from.
Why were there four firms initially, and later only one firm for a period
of nearly thirty years? This has puzzled us a lot, and made it necessary to
test two alternative models of LNG liquefaction costs incorporating theories
of mark-up pricing.
4 Factors influencing the price of LNG liquefaction capacity
An LNG liquefaction unit is created as the result of a large and complicated
construction project. Actual construction typically takes several years, and
involves extensive engineering work. The following factors will be crucial for
total construction costs:
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4.1 Infrastructure
In addition to the liquefaction plant, well and pumping equipment at the gas
field, pipelines from the gas field to the liquefaction plant and harbour facilities
for storage and loading LNG on to the LNG ships, need to be designed and
built. Some of these costs, particularly onshore facilities directly related to
the LNG plant, are sometimes included in the oﬃcial cost figures, and make
it necessary to control for these other cost factors. However, we lack detailed
data on all the cost components, and are not able to include this into our
regressions directly.
4.2 Number of trains/capacity on trains
A liquefaction plant has a certain capacity, commonly measured in million
tons natural gas processed per year. Taking into account that a liquefaction
plant has a certain optimal lifetime, the lifetime capacity of the plant should
of course not exceed the total amount of gas resources available at the site.
On the other hand, we are more prone to believe that downstream market
conditions have put an upper bound on total capacity limiting the utilization
of potential scale advantages.
There may be economies of scale connected either to the total capacity
of the plant or to the capacity of each train making up the plant. Since a
train nearly is a complete plant, we would expect eventual scale advantages
in liquefaction per se to be connected to train size. Older facilities tend to
have trains with lower capacities, but still more than one train. If there were
scale advantages to train size, we are puzzled with respect to why each train
was not made bigger. One reason could be that facilities made up of more
trains are likely to have less supply problems, that is, if one train is down,
the plant can still process LNG from the other trains.
Another reason could be that later technological advances have made it
possible to make gradually bigger trains. It is argued that increased gas
turbine eﬃciency combined with larger turbine units have reduced the number
of gas turbines needed in LNG plants by half since the industry start-up (see
Troner (2001)). This may have made it easier to build larger trains.
4.3 Organizational learning
There are 20 export plants currently in operation or under construction. At
many of these sites additional trains have been added many years after the
start up date. With respect to trains, there are at present 80 trains in opera-
tion or under construction worldwide, see EIA (2003). Our hypothesis is that
organizational learning with respect to constructing and building a liquefac-
tion train takes place each time a train is built, independent of whether the
train is added to an existing plant or the train is set up on a greenfield site.
Further, we conjecture that the capacity of the train does not influence learn-
ing, that is, learning reduces liquefaction costs by the same rate independent
of train size.
Clearly, some sort of learning also takes place while running a liquefaction
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plant. One example could be the experience gathered with the Philips, Kenai
plant from 1969. Although this plant has only one train, it has operated at
more than 95% of capacity for more than 30 years, maybe making it more
acceptable for today’s buyers of LNG production technologies to rely on one
train facilities.
Another example could be the reduced need for design redundancy. The
dominant Asian LNG market has historically focused more on security of
supply than other regional markets e.g. LNG is and has been Japan’s only
source of natural gas imports. Consequently, LNG greenfield projects in the
Asian region have historically been planned using ample capacity margins
and redundant design features in order to assure security of supply and the
ability to meet its contract supply obligations. Experience with production of
LNG may however have decreased the need for design redundancy, and hence,
reduced the capital costs of later trains.
4.4 Experience induced process R&D
There is much writing about technological advances in the literature about
the LNG business, however, we have not discovered examples of major tech-
nological breakthroughs in the history of LNG. Neither have the LNG history
shown any important diﬀerence in thermodynamic eﬃciency between the dif-
ferent liquefaction technologies (see Troner (2001)).
Many of the inventions seem to be of a process nature, that is, they
have gradually reduced running costs. A steady decrease in power require-
ments may be the most apparent development of this kind. The power re-
quirement for the world’s first base load LNG plant at Arzew, Algeria was
509kwhrs/tonne LNG, while the power requirement at current installations
are around 250-330 kwhrs/tonne LNG. This has happened through evolution
of compressor design and advances in turbine drivers.
At the ongoing Snøhvit installation, Norway, this process may have been
taken even further by using electric powering of compressors with on site
CCGT generation of electricity instead of compressors with direct gas tur-
bine drive, see www.statoil.com. This should improve energy eﬃciency even
further, and hence a given gas reserve can last longer and produce more LNG
for sale. However, because our focus is on capital cost of liquefaction, our
study will not pick up such changes.
4.5 Autonomous technological change
As already mentioned, some of the technologies used for LNG liquefaction,
have improved independent of the development of the LNG business. One
example is gas turbine technology, and we would expect materials technology
to have improved in general. We aim to pick up this eﬀect by including a
time trend in our experience curve model.
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4.6 Competition between suppliers of liquefaction technology
As in most other experience curve studies, we do not possess actual cost
data, but data about the price paid by the buyer of the object under study.
This implies that we must take into consideration that the price for an LNG
liquefaction unit may include a mark-up. As already described in some detail,
the number of competing technologies has varied a lot since the start of the
LNG business. It is therefore also likely that the intensity of competition and
the mark-up have varied considerably. We explicitly include a mark-up in our
model. Further, we test two alternative formalizations of the mark-up. This
is described in more detail in section six below.
4.7 Output prices
The price on LNG has tended to follow the price on oil, mostly as a formal
link in bilateral trade contracts. LNG may be regarded as a substitute for
oil; both can be used as input to the chemical industry, to heat buildings,
to produce electricity etc. Hence, to the extent that a higher oilprice leads
to increased demand for LNG, the downstream price of LNG may follow as
observed. Up-stream, the suppliers of LNG liquefaction technology may have
used this as an opportunity to increase their mark-up. This is treated in more
detail in section six below.
4.8 Other factors
In addition to the factors mentioned, there are clearly a lot of other factors
influencing costs. Environmental/safety regulations may be important. In
many cases, innovations that reduce running costs, also reduce the environ-
mental impact. Since energy for liquefaction is provided from burning natural
gas at the site, an LNG facility emits large amounts of greenhouse gases like
CO2, and local pollutants like nitric oxides etc. By improving energy eﬃ-
ciency, the emission intensity of the liquefaction process is also reduced. In
fact, we may have that the quest for energy eﬃciency and reduced emissions
drives capital costs up.
We do not include a variable aiming to pick up the eﬀect of environmen-
tal/safety regulations. Hence, we should not be particularly surprised if capi-
tal cost is influenced only weakly or even positively from a time trend aiming
to pick up technological improvements since environmental/safety regulations
are likely to have been strengthened through time. On the other hand, in a
study of five diﬀerent LNG projects, DiNapoli and Yost (2003) found no re-
lationship between low environmental impact and high capital costs.
Prices on central inputs may have increased more or less than the price
index we use to inflate historical prices, and by this lead to biased estimates
of what is driving LNG liquefaction costs. According to OMAN LNG, the
two train facility at Qalhat involved 10,000 tons of steel, 40 million man
hours of construction time and some 100,000 cubic meters of concrete for the
foundation alone. Even though 40,000 tons of steel sounds impressive, the
steelcost would with current steel prices make up less than 1% of total capital
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costs. Construction time is more important. The expenses related to both
financing and insurance as well as personnel wages are accumulating for each
day of construction. We would therefore have liked to adjust for spatial and
time related diﬀerences in financing costs and pay to construction workers,
however, we miss data to correct for these possible eﬀects.
According to our sources, the properties of the feed gas is also a significant
cost issue. Large amounts of sulphur in the feed gas require removal and re-
covery facilities. Similarly, large amounts of CO2 also require its own removal
facility. As far as we know, the Snøhvit LNG factory in Norway will be the
first LNG liquefaction facility for which the CO2 is not only removed, but
also pumped back into the geological structure containing the natural gas.
5 Data and data sources
Collecting cost data for LNG liquefaction units has been a long and cum-
bersome process. Since there exists no public database of LNG liquefaction
costs, we have had to rely on occasional articles in Petroleum Economist,
World Gas Intelligence and the Oil and Gas Journal. Book publications as
”The Fundamentals of the LNG Industry” (Petroleum Economist (2001)),
various internet press releases from the diﬀerent technology licensors and all
kinds of newspapers, as well as talks with key persons in the LNG business,
also proved to be valuable sources for information about capital costs.
In particular, we have gone through all the issues of the Petroleum Econo-
mist from 1955 up to the current date. Cost data about LNG liquefaction
have mostly appeared there, in cover stories about new LNG projects. These
articles were often written before the LNG liquefaction unit had begun op-
erating, but nearly always after the project had been agreed. Hence, many
of our cost data must be viewed as ex ante estimates, and not the actual
accounted costs. On the other hand, for many of the datapoints, we have ex
post confirmation, that is, the same cost is reported in a later article, in a
book etc.
Each LNG project is regarded as one cost observation, however several
projects in our dataset consist of construction of more than one production
train. In those cases we divide the total project cost figures on the number
of trains installed to calculate average train capital costs.
In order to estimate organizational experience eﬀects, the data set must
be sorted as a time series. In case our data are reported after start-up, we use
the time of LNG plant start-up as the sorting measure. On the other hand,
if the cost data is an estimate from an articled published before start-up, we
use the publication date. 2
In addition to estimating organizational experience eﬀects, we also use
the dates to investigate whether a time trend picking up general technolog-
ical change has influenced costs. In order to estimate the time trend more
2This is not a big point, because such a sorting principle yields almost the same sorting
of datapoints as the sorting that would have resulted from using only the dates that the
liquefaction units came into operation.
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correctly, we constructed a ”year-counter” based on our start-up- or publica-
tion date informations. This ”year-counter”, based on total months elapsed
since the prior LNG plant observation, divided by 12, for all the observations,
provides the exact relative diﬀerence in time between each data observation.
All price data, apart from two observations, are in current U.S. $. We
have taken all figures and inflated to 2003 U.S. $ by using the consumer price
index inflation calculator served by the US Department of Labor. We also
have one observation in English £, and another in French Francs. In this case
we have transformed it into U.S. $ by the exchange rate at that time, and
inflated it afterwards.
Table 1 presents the two main descriptive statistics i.e. average capacity
cost and average train size.
Table 1 ”Descriptive statistics”
billion $/mty mty (capacity on trains)
Mean 0.3231 2.6918
Std. 0.1305 1.2994
The main puzzle with the dataset is the low costs for the first five facilities.
Today, the Philips Atlantic LNG plant at Trinidad is viewed as the state-
of-the-art liquefaction plant. The plant began operating in 1999, had only
one train with a capacity of 3.2 million tons LNG per year, and liquefaction
capacity cost of 0.244 billion $ per mty (million tons per year), that is, well
below the mean cost of capacity as given in Table 1, and well above the mean
train size also reported in Table 1. These figures should be compared with
the first five LNG liquefaction installations:
Table 2 ”The first five installations”
Site Start up Technology Trainsize bill.$/mty 1)
Arzew, Algeria 1964 Prico 0.37 mty 0.219
Kenai, Alaska 1969 Philips 1.40 ” 0.203
Marsa El Brega, Libya 1970 APCI 0.65 ” 0.163
Skikda, Algeria 1972 Teal 1.10 ” 0.235
Lumut, Brunei 1972 APCI 1.06 ” 0.253
1) All figures are in 2003 U.S. $
Observe that all capacity costs are below the mean cost, and further, that
the train sizes are very small.
After Lumut, Brunei, no new facility was built until 1977 in Abu Dhabi,
and then at a considerably higher capacity cost; 0,414 bill. $/mty. All ob-
servations above are based on capital cost estimates for liquefaction alone.
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Further, for many of the observations we have multiple sources (see for ex-
ample DiNapoli (1986) and Thomas (1997)). Diﬀerences in observed capacity
cost, may not only stem from diﬀerences in real costs, but also from diﬀer-
ences in mark-up pricing. Hence, we need to look further into the possible
mark-up in selling liquefaction plants.
6 The Mark-Up on LNG liquefaction
6.1 Upstream Cournot competition
In order to analyze factors which are likely to determine the size of the mark-
up, we will present a formal model. With respect to our data set, we are
especially interested in to what extent the mark-up is linked to the oil price
and to the number of firms supplying LNG liquefaction technology.
LNG is mostly traded in long term contracts specifying both sales volume
and price. The sellers of LNG are in most cases consortia in which the owner
of the gas resource has a major share. Hence, we may assume that eventual
resource rent is collected downstream, and not upstream on the input price
of the feed gas. For each liquefaction unit, the consortium owning the unit,
normally sells to more than one buyer. The buyers are typically national gas
companies using LNG to supplement their supply of piped natural gas, power
plants using LNG to produce electricity, or industry using LNG as input in
the production process.
We will look at the price formation of LNG liquefaction capacity in a
Cournot game. The point of departure for constructing the demand schedule
for LNG liquefaction capacity is each particular LNG project. For each project
the initiators of the LNG project i.e. the LNG consortium, meet with the
potential buyers of LNG and agree on the volume/price given the price on
LNG liquefaction capacity.
We assume that the number of LNG projects in each time period is ex-
ogenously given. Further, that the suppliers of LNG liquefaction technology
compete simultaneously for all the projects in that time period. Thus, in the
Cournot game suppliers of LNG liquefaction units compete given the demand
schedule for LNG liquefaction capacity from all the projects in the time pe-
riod. While the number of projects is exogenous, the scale of each project
depends on the LNG liquefaction capacity price.
Assume that the end-user demand for LNG is given by the following linear
demand function:
xd = a− bwl + dwo, (2)
where xd is total demand for LNG, wl is the price of LNG at export
terminal, wo is the price of oil, and where a, b and d are constants/parameters.
The demand function should be interpreted as a residual demand function,
that is, demand given that we have full capacity utilization of piped natural
gas to the region.
Each LNG consortium acts as a monopoly. Hence, it maximizes:
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ω = [wl − ρ] [a− bwl + dwo]− σκ, (3)
where ρ is cost per. unit LNG capacity at export terminal (liquefaction),
and σκ is site specific infrastructure costs. The first order condition for profit
maximum yields, after some rearranging, the price of LNG:
wl =
a+ dwo + bρ
2b
. (4)
Data from IEA (2001) shows that the price of LNG has indeed tended to
follow the oil price. By inserting the price from (4) into the demand function
(2), we find the supply xs from the consortium:
xs =
a− bρ+ dwo
2
.
Total supply of LNG depends on how many LNG projects that are com-
pleted by diﬀerent LNG consortia in a given time period. Assume that Γ LNG
projects are currently being completed. Total demand for LNG capacity is
then given:
xTs =
Γ[
κ=1
aκ − bκρ+ dκwo
2
Assume that aκ = a, bκ = b and dκ = d for all projects. We then get
the following inverse demand function for LNG capacity: ρ = a+dwob −
2
bΓx
T
s .
There are m suppliers of LNG liquefaction technology currently being active.
We further assume that they play a one shot Cournot game given the total
demand for LNG capacity. Let xTs =
mS
i=1
xi. We then have that each LNG
liquefaction supplier i maximizes its profit πi:
πi =
+%
a+ dwo
b
− 2
bΓ
m[
i=1
xi
&
− ci
,
xi
where ci is the capacity cost of LNG liquefaction. The first order condi-
tions are:
∂πi
∂xi
=
%
a+ dwo
b
− 2
bΓ
m[
i=1
xi
&
− ci −
2
bΓxi = 0, ∀i.
We assume symmetric LNG liquefaction technology suppliers i.e. ci = c,
∀i. The first-order conditions are then easily solved:
xi = Γ
a+ dwo − bc
2(m+ 1)
. (5)
And we get the price of liquefaction capacity:
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ρ =
1
m+ 1
(
a+ dwo
b
) +
m
m+ 1
c, (6)
and the mark-up over costs:
ρ− c
c
=
1
m+ 1

a+ dwo
bc
− 1

(7)
Note that while the oilprice increases the mark-up, the number of LNG
liquefaction suppliers decreases the mark-up.
Further, note from (5) that total supply of LNG liquefaction capacity, that
is mxi = xTs = mΓa+dwo−bci2(m+1) , increases when the price of oil increases. Look-
ing to our dataset and the number of new LNG facilities in the period 1977
to 1984, it does seem like the supply of LNG liquefaction capacity increased
slightly some years after the oil-price shock in 1973.
On the other hand, equation (7) is not suitable for our econometric ex-
perience curve model. We will therefore test a variant of (7), see the next
section.
6.2 ”War of attrition”
The models above do not actually answer the question posed at the end of
section five: Why were there four firms initially supplying liquefaction technol-
ogy, and later only one firm for a period of nearly thirty years? Hence, we will
also briefly look at a second alternative. Assume that instead of Cournot com-
petition in which all liquefaction technology firms may make positive profit
before fixed costs, the LNG liquefaction firms play a Bertrand game, and
that the diﬀerent technologies are perfect substitutes (see for instance Troner
(2001) which states that there is no important diﬀerence in thermodynamic
eﬃciency between the diﬀerent liquefaction technologies). This implies that
when m ≥ 2, the price will be equal to marginal cost of liquefaction capac-
ity i.e. ρ = ci. To the extent that liquefaction firms also have fixed costs,
they will all have negative profits, and we get a ”war of attrition” from which
only one firm can survive, and continue to supply liquefaction technology (see
Tirole (1997), page 311-314).
Then, when all firms except one have left the business i.e. m = 1, we
assume that the price on LNG liquefaction is set as above, that is, the owner of
the remaining LNG liquefaction technology acts as a monopoly. This implies
that the liquefaction capacity price ρ is given:
ρ = mu(wo) ∗ ci (for m = 1),
where mu(wo) > 1 is the mark-up as a function of the oilprice.
The constant mark-up is assumed to hold for all observations from 1977
until 1999. In this period only APCI supplied liquefaction technology ex-
cept from one case. For the years from 1999 on Bechtel, Linde and later
Shell entered the liquefaction market with their proprietary technologies, and
hence, the companies will in the Bertrand model enter a new round of fierce
competition through the ”war of attrition”.
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7 The liquefaction cost model
Basically, we treat our dataset as 40 observations of the same cost function
in diﬀerent points in time. Because diﬀerent technologies may diﬀer with re-
spect to cost structure, we control for the two historically main technologies;
APCI and Philips/Bechtel, by using dummies. The four other technologies,
Prico, Teal, Linde and Shell, are in the dataset represented by one or two
observations respectively, and will be embodied in the constant term. Orga-
nizational learning is an argument in the cost function which varies according
to time. We assume that learning is industry wide, and that liquefaction firms
are myopic i.e. they set the price on liquefaction capacity based on current
unit cost.
The previous discussion suggests that the price of an LNG liquefaction
unit may for all or some periods exceed the costs. Let ρt denote the price on
LNG liquefaction capacity recorded for a liquefaction installation t measured
in $ per mt/year. We then formulate the following log linear model:
lnρt = α0 + lnmutj(wt,mt) + α1gt + α2dPhil + α3dAPCI (8)
+α4 ln (Qt) + α5 ln

qt
nt

+ α6 (datt) + ut
The liquefaction unit t may consist of trains that are added to an existing
facility, or one or more trains built on a greenfield site. The other variables
are as follows:
mutj(wt,mt) = the mark-up in model alternative j (see specification below).
The arguments of the mark-up function are wt; a moving average of
the oilprice for the last five years, and mt; the number of competing
LNG liquefaction technologies being marketed at the time of a final
construction agreement. It is of course diﬃcult to measure the latter
variable. Even though the APCI technology seems to have dominated
the LNG liquefaction market for the whole period from 1972 to 1999,
we do not know to what extent it has been constantly challenged by the
other technologies.
gt = a dummy adjusting for infrastructure cost. The variable gt takes the
value 0 if our observation includes only liquefaction plant capital costs,
and the value 1 if our cost observation also includes other cost factors
than the mere liquefaction unit. Of a total 40 cost observations 10 in-
clude total cost figures. These are typically greenfield facilities, often
involving pipelines from the gas field, as well as storage and loading fa-
cilities. Clearly, using a dummy in order to pick up such cost diﬀerences
is a rude measure, however, we lack data to refine the measure further.
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dPhil, dAPCI = dummies specifying the liquefaction technology. Since we
only have one or two observations for the other technologies respectively,
these technologies are treated together as the last category.
Qt = accumulated LNG liquefaction trains built at the time of train t. As
mentioned, we measure organizational learning as accumulated experi-
ence with the building of new liquefaction trains. Our point of departure
is that learning has been industry wide.

qt
nt

= total capacity of facility t divided by the number of trains at fa-
cility t. This variable is intended to pick up eventual scale advantages
in liquefaction. Clearly, there may be scale advantages connected to
infrastructure and total capacity of a facility. On the other hand, our
focus is on liquefaction cost per se, and we have therefore sought to
separate liquefaction costs from infrastructure costs.
datt = date of start-up/date of publishing of cost data. In addition to being a
measure to sort the observations, we also use the date of start-up/date
of publishing of cost data, earlier explained as the ”year-counter”, in
order to identify any time trend suggesting some form of technological
development, or other kind of development.
Lastly, αh, h = 1, ...6 are parameters.
We will use the following expressions for the mark-up:
mutj(wt,mt) =
[wt]
β1 [mt]
β2 for j = 1, t = 1, ..., 41
1 for j = 2, t = 1, ..., 5; 23, ..., 40
[wt]
β3 expβ4 for j = 2, t = 6, ..., 22
(9)
where βk, k = 1, ...4 are parameters. The notation j = 1 denotes Cournot
competition, while j = 2 denotes Bertrand competition. The rationale behind
these alternatives are outlined above. We have chosen to model the mark-up
as simple as possible making the eﬀect of the oilprice and the eﬀect of the
number of competitors separable.
Our data set consists of 40 observations of capacity costs of which 10
includes infrastructure and the rest is given for liquefaction only. The error
term ut is assumed to be normally distributed with ∼ N(0,σt). Due to the
diﬀerent character of our cost observations, that is, some are ex ante estimates,
others are historical costs, some include infrastructure, many do not etc., we
do not assume constant variance.3 Consequently, we will use WLS - weighted
least squares using OLS residuals - as our estimation method. The estimations
are carried out in PcGive with use of the special panel data package.
3This was confirmed by initial estimations using the OLS method, which lead us to reject
the H0-hypothesis of homoscedastisity within our dataset.
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8 Estimation results
We started with a full dataset estimation of the whole model, labeled Model
1, using the alternative j = 1 expression for the mark-up. That is, the market
actors play a one shot Cournot game incorporating both the oil price and the
number of competitors in their quantity setting behavior. Next we ran a series
of estimations removing non-significant variables successively. The results are
displayed in Table 3 below.
Table 3 ”WLS on the whole dataset”
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
α1 
0.1668** 
(0.0655) 
0.1767*** 
(0.0612) 
0.1786*** 
(0.0620) 
0.1629*** 
(0.0594) 
0.1668*** 
(0.0596) 
α2 
-0.1380 
(0.0929) 
-0.1432 
(0.0911) 
-0.0649 
(0.0708) - - 
α3 
-0.1160 
(0.0968) 
-0.1255 
(0.0935) - - - 
α4 
0.1189 
(0.1367) 
0.1560 
(0.1101) 
0.1108 
(0.1061) 
0.1208 
(0.1052) - 
α5 
0.0679 
(0.1451) - - - - 
α6 
-0.0136* 
(0.0068) 
-0.0129* 
(0.0065) 
-0.0108* 
(0.0064) 
-0.0117* 
(0.0063) 
-0.0049** 
(0.0022) 
β1 0.1212* (0.0687) 
0.1173* 
(0.0673) 
0.1292* 
(0.0676) 
0.1254* 
(0.0761) 
0.1481** 
(0.0646) 
β2 -0.3721*** (0.0619) 
-0.3646*** 
(0.0590) 
-0.3344*** 
(0.0552) 
-0.3529*** 
(0.0513) 
-0.3771*** 
(0.0470) 
R2 85.5 % 85.4 % 84.6 % 84.2 % 83.6 % 
n 40 40 40 40 40 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, * 90% level of significance, **95% level of signif-
icance. ***99% level of significance.
As can be seen from Model 1, only the infrastructure cost dummy, the
time trend variable, the oil price and the number of competitors came out
significant at a 90 % level or more in the full dataset estimation covering all
variables. This implies that we did not find any evidence of systematically
diﬀerent pricing of technology between APCI or Philips and the other tech-
nologies available through time. From this we might assume that there have
been no real diﬀerence in construction costs between plants using the two
leading technologies and plants using alternative technologies, however the
data sample for the alternative technologies are modest.
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Next, and more importantly, we didn’t find any significant eﬀects from
either experience or scale on liquefaction plant capacity pricing. However, as
one would expect, we discovered a strong time related positive correlation both
between accumulated trains and train capacity and each of them combined
with the time trend variable, which would weaken their respective partial
regression coeﬃcients in the estimations. Still, we found evidence of a robust
significant time trend influencing LNG plant pricing, which may stem from
an anticipated general technological development.
The lack of significant findings from both learning- and scale eﬀects are
somewhat surprising, as these factors are often related to new technology
developments. Particularly the steady increase in single train capacities has
commonly been associated with the falling costs of LNG capacity. In addition,
as the technology has matured and more experience is gained, it is likely that
the need for ample capacity design margins has gradually diminished.
The significant impact from both the oil price and the number of sup-
pliers of diﬀerent technologies on the mark-up pricing behavior was expected
according to our formal model, shown in section six. Particularly competition
seems to have had a strong impact on LNG liquefaction capacity pricing, as
we find both a high coeﬃcient value and a high level of significance for the
eﬀect on capacity pricing from the number of competitors at each point in
time.
The key findings from the full dataset estimation were further strenght-
ened by additional estimation results, where non-significant variables were
removed successively, labeled Model 2-Model 5 in table 3. The time trend
eﬀect is rather weak though in all regressions. Based on model 5, the yearly
decrease in liquefaction capacity pricing due to the time trend was about 0,5%
per year in the period 1970 to 1999. On the other hand, the greenfield eﬀect
is rather strong. Compared to adding a new train to an existing facility, the
cost of capacity increases by about 17% if a liquefaction train is installed at
a greenfield site.
8.1 Firm specific learning
In order to look more into learning and competition we also ran WLS estima-
tions on two sub samples, one consisting of the APCI liquefaction trains only
and one sample also including the Philips technology trains. As APCI has
been the dominant producer of liquefaction technology since the early 1970´s,
delivering 59 out of a total 81 trains in our dataset, we may find that APCI has
developed a technology-specific experience with respect to their production
costs. As the Philips technology also has been present both in the early stage
of the LNG industry as well as in the later years, it is also interesting to con-
trol for any price diﬀerences between these two leading technologies. Starting
with the APCI dataset we could remove the technology dummies α2 and α3,
and the results from the estimations are reported in Table 4 below, labeled
Model 6 and 7. The results from the estimations using the APCI/Philips
dataset are labeled Model 8 and 9 in Table 4.
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Table 4 ”WLS on the APCI/Philips dataset”
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
α1 
0.1519* 
(0.0846) 
0.1711** 
(0.0779) 
0.1795** 
(0.0693) 
0.1721*** 
(0.0593) 
α2 - - 
-0.0609 
(0.0876) - 
α3 - - - - 
α4 
0.4340 
(0.3685) 
0.6255** 
(0.2474) 
0.4828 
(0.3330) 
0.6183** 
(0.2307) 
α5 
0.1190 
(0.1832) - 
0.0447 
(0.1626) - 
α6 
-0.0279* 
(0.0136) 
-0.0313*** 
(0.0110) 
-0.0267** 
(0.0128) 
-0.0307*** 
(0.0104) 
β1 0.0476 (0.0879) - 
0.0665 
(0.0844) - 
β2 -0.3805*** (0.0699) 
-0.3692*** 
(0.0637) 
-0.3539*** 
(0.0655) 
-0.3808*** 
(0.0507) 
R2 85.5 % 85.0 % 85.9 % 85.3 % 
n 26 26 35 35 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, * 90% level of significance, **95% level of signif-
icance. ***99% level of significance.
The results from both sub sample estimations are generally similar to the
full dataset estimations, that is the infrastructure dummy, the time trend and
the number of competitors seem to have a robust significant eﬀect on the unit
price of an LNG production train. The results thus strenghten our earlier
findings that indicate oligopolistic LNG liquefaction plant pricing. Moreover,
the eﬀect from the oil price is still positive, but no longer significant, as was
the case in the full dataset estimations.
Interestingly, both the experience and scale coeﬃcients came out positive
in all estimations, including the full dataset. Rather controversially, for both
the sub samples the experience eﬀect was even significant at a 95% level, that
is experience increases costs! We believe that these highly atypical results
may stem from some unknown factor, possibly related to the mark-up pricing
element. Allover, these findings strenghten the arguments against the hy-
pothesis of extended experience eﬀects within LNG liquefaction construction
costs. We therefore doubt that any experience has taken place with respect
to construction costs of the APCI-licenced LNG plants. With respect to any
possible diﬀerences between the APCI and the Philips liquefaction technology,
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the estimations provided no significant findings of diﬀerences in the pricing
behavior.
8.2 War of attrition
To elaborate on our earlier findings regarding both experience eﬀects and
monopoly power, we also tried the alternative mark-up model on the full
dataset (j = 2 in eq.(10)). Using the Bertrand-competition-based mark-up
we a priori assume that the low unit prices for both the first LNG plants
and plants in recent years was a direct result of fierce competition through
marginal cost pricing. This may bring forward possible experience eﬀects in
a better way compared with the earlier model estimations. We continued the
same estimation procedure of removing variables successively, and the main
results are presented as Model 10-12 in table 5 below.
Table 5 ”Alternative model of mark-up”
 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
α1 
0.1667** 
(0.0753) 
0.1482** 
(0.0665) 
0.1504** 
(0.0667) 
α2 
-0.1155 
(0.1053) - - 
α3 
-0.0637 
(0.1076) - - 
α4 
0.1476 
(0.1546) 
0.1343 
(0.1169) - 
α5 
0.0013 
(0.1619) - - 
α6 
-0.0122 
(0.0078) 
-0.0119 
(0.0071) 
-0.0042* 
(0.0025) 
β3 0.1243 (0.0785) 
0.1241 
(0.0750) 
0.1474** 
(0.0726) 
β4 0.4459*** (0.0958) 
0.4585*** 
(0.0800) 
0.4976*** 
(0.0728) 
R2 81.5 % 80.8 % 80.0 % 
N 40 40 40 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, * 90% level of significance, **95% level of signif-
icance. ***99% level of significance.
With respect to the main findings from the earlier full model estimations,
the alternative mark-up model performs much the same. That is, we find
neither a significant experience eﬀect nor a scale eﬀect on LNG plant unit
costs, while the oil price, a time trend and particularly a dummy (β4) taking
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the value 1 in periods with mark-up pricing, show robust and significant
characteristics. Thus, in all of our full model estimations, irrespective of
mark-up model, the number of competitors stayed significant above a 99%
level, hence, rivalry between diﬀerent liquefaction technologies seem to have
had a robust influence on LNG plant capacity pricing over the years.4
9 Conclusion
Our study casts doubt on the belief that there has occurred experience eﬀects
with respect to the capital costs of LNG liquefaction facilities. Our conjecture
is that the total number of LNG trains is still to few, and the construction too
spread out over a long time period to foster any significant experience eﬀects
in liquefaction technology production. Alternatively, the huge financial risks
involved in an LNG project may have delayed major technological develop-
ments. As the liquefaction technology proved itself reliable, the risks involved
in new technologies and possible delivery failures may have been greater than
the possible cost advantages from improved technology and more eﬀective
production.
Another, and maybe more plausible explanation, is that the relatively
weak competition in much of the history of LNG has weakened the incen-
tives for technology improvements. The fact that one company, APCI, has
appeared to control the business for nearly 30 years, may well have eased
their eﬀorts of cost reductions. Indeed, it seems like the unit price of an LNG
plant has fallen after the return of the Philips/Bechtel technology in 1999
and the introduction of the Shell and Linde technology later on. However,
this finding may be a consequence of shrinking mark-ups rather than cost
reductions, which is also supported by our estimation results. We generally
find robust and significant evidence of mark-up pricing in all of our model
simulations. Hence, the apparent fall in LNG liquefaction construction costs
the last decade is most likely to originate from increased competition between
diﬀerent liquefaction technologies.
If our model draw the right conclusions it is not reasonable to believe that
the current cost reductions will continue in a longer term, as the price of LNG
plants sooner or later will approach marginal costs of production. However,
competition in itself may trigger technological change, and only after we have
seen a substantial number of new LNG projects come on stream, we may
draw more robust conclusions with respect to where we are on the LNG plant
construction experience curve.
4 In order to investigate even further a possible experience eﬀect within our dataset we
also estimated a model where we assumed some sort of tacit collusion among the LNG tech-
nology suppliers after the reintroduction of the Philips technology. That is, we assumed
that they didn’t restore to marginal cost pricing, but kept the monopoly price. This model,
however, provided almost identical results as compared with our formal Bertrand compe-
tition model. Not surprisingly, our tacit collusion model also showed considerable lower
explanatory power.
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Appendix 
Table A1. LNG plant dataset  
  LNG plant  Country Start- up  Technology # trains
Capacity/ train 
(mty) 
Capital unit costs 
(2003$ bn/mty) 
1  Camel, Arzew GL 4Z  Algeria 1964 Prico 3 0.37 0.219 
2  Kenai, Alaska  USA 1969 Phillips 2 0.70 0.203 
3  Marsa El Brega  Libya 1970 APCI 4 0.65 0.163 
4  Skikda, Phase 1  Algeria 1972 Teal 3 1.10 0.235 
5  Lumut  Brunei 1972 APCI 5 1.06 0.253 
6  Adgas, Das Island  Abu Dhabi 1977 APCI 2 1.50 0.414 
7  Arzew, GL 1Z  Algeria 1978 APCI 6 1.21 0.415 
8  Arun, Phase 1  Indonesia 1978 APCI 3 1.40 0.532 
9  Arzew GL 2Z  Algeria 1981 APCI 6 1.27 0.439 
10  Bontang, Phase 2  Indonesia 1983 APCI 2 2.00 0.416 
11  MLNG I, Bintulu  Malaysia 1984 APCI 3 2.00 0.495 
12  Arun, Phase 2  Indonesia 1984 APCI 2 1.65 0.505 
13  Arun, Phase 3  Indonesia 1986 APCI 1 1.50 0.342 
14  Burrup Northwest Shelf  Australia 1989 APCI 2 2.00 0.452 
15  Adgas, Das Island 3  Abu Dhabi 1994 APCI 1 2.30 0.450 
16  MLNG II (Dua)  Malaysia 1995 APCI 2 2.60 0.403 
17  Qatargas, T1+2  Qatar 1997 APCI 2 2.00 0.545 
18  Qatargas 3  Qatar 1998 APCI 1 2.00 0.303 
19  Bontang, T7  Indonesia 1998 APCI 1 2.60 0.429 
20  Bontang, T8  Indonesia 1999 APCI 1 2.95 0.261 
21  Atlantic LNG, T1  Trinidad& Tobago 1999 Phillips 1 3.20 0.244 
22  Bonny Island, T1+2  Nigeria 1999 APCI 2 2.95 0.421 
23  Rasgas, T1+2  Qatar 1999 APCI 2 2.60 0.314 
24  Qalhat, T1+2  Oman 1999 APCI 2 3.00 0.275 
25  Bonny Island T3  Nigeria 2002 APCI 1 2.95 0.289 
26  Atlantic LNG, T2+3  Trinidad& Tobago 2003 Phillips 2 3.20 0.175 
27  MLNG III (TIGA)  Malaysia 2003 APCI 2 3.80 0.211 
28  Burrup Nortwest Shelf, T4  Australia 2004 Linde 1 4.20 0.205 
29  Damietta  Egypt 2005 APCI 1 5.00 0.208 
30  Bonny Island, T4+5  Nigeria 2005 APCI 2 4.00 0.217 
31  Idku ELNG, T1  Egypt 2005 Phillips 1 3.60 0.255 
32  Atlantic LNG, T4  Trinidad& Tobago 2005 Phillips 1 5.20 0.231 
33  Rasgas, T3+4  Qatar 2005 Philips 2 4.70 0.255 
34  Qalhat, T3  Oman 2006 APCI 1 3.30 0.189 
35  Darwin LNG  Australia 2006 Phillips 1 5.00 0.200 
36  Idku ELNG, T2  Egypt 2006 Phillips 1 3.60 0.153 
37  Snøhvit  Norway 2006 Linde 1 4.11 0.279 
38  Tangguh  Indonesia 2007 APCI 2 3.50 0.200 
39  Bioko Island LNG  Equatorial Guinea 2007 Philips 1 3.40 0.260 
40  Sakhalin II  Russia 2007 SDMR 2 4.70 0.213 
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